Cybersecurity: Converting Shock into Action by Tremaine, Robert & Shaw, Paul
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2018-04-30
Cybersecurity: Converting Shock into Action
Tremaine, Robert; Shaw, Paul
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58712
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Case StudyBackground Research Tools
Cybersecurity: Converting Shock into Action 
Rob Tremaine











Defense Acquisition University 
Research Focus:
Defense Acquisition Workforce
Source: DataMart as of 31 Dec 2017
Active AT&L Workforce Count 2018
Auditing 4,120 0 0 0 4,120
Business - Cost Estimating 80 498 257 564 1,399
Business - Financial Mgmt 528 2,080 1,737 2,203 6,548
Contracting 7,939 8,289 7,943 6,515 30,686
Engineering 2,125 9,178 9,084 22,615 43,002
Facilities Engineering 91 573 4,207 5,604 10,475
Industrial/Contract Property Mgmt 268 18 47 67 400
Information Technology 1,038 1,334 1,735 3,179 7,286
Life Cycle Logistics 3,118 3,301 7,011 6,470 19,900
Production, Quality and Manufacturing 5,281 431 1,395 3,449 10,556
Program Management 1,828 5,892 3,305 6,223 17,248
Program System Engineer 8 0 0 0 8
Purchasing 520 62 389 439 1,410
Science and Technology Manager 120 2,668 469 519 3,776
Test and Evaluation 370 3,170 1,860 3,357 8,757
Unknown 7 1 8 24 40
Totals 27,441 37,495 39,447 61,228 165,611
4th Estate Air Force Army Navy Total
Background
• Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities: for years chipmakers have taken steps to
prioritize performance and speed at the expense of security.
• Heartbleed and Shellshock demonstrated the challenges with wide-scale and
real-time patching, but these issues had been dormant for decades and proved
the impossibility of issuing replacements.
• Shadow Brokers breached the spy tools of the elite NSA-linked operation known as
the Equation Group, and offered a sample of alleged stolen NSA data and attempted
to auction off a bigger trove. They also stole NASA’s Windows exploit known as
EternalBlue to infect targets in two high-profile ransomware attacks.
• WannaCry, a ransomware strain spread around the world, walloping hundreds of thousands of targets,
including public utilities and large corporations. It temporarily crippled National Health Service hospitals
and facilities in the United Kingdom, hobbling emergency rooms, delaying vital medical procedures, and
creating chaos for many British patients.
• Petya/NotPetya/Nyetya/Goldeneye, a more advanced variation of Wannacry, it disrupted utilities like power 
companies, airports, public transit, and the central bank, just the latest in a series of cyber assaults against the Ukraine.
• Wikileaks CIA Vault 7 detailed individual tools for things like using Wi-Fi signals to track a device's location, and 
persistently surveilling MACs by controlling the fundamental layer of code that coordinates hardware and software.
Environmental Scan—Inherent Security Holes and Malicious Actors 
The Public domain…and threat of COTs
Background Current state of the DoD—Maneuver Undetected
• “DOD missions and systems remain
at risk from adversarial cyber
operations…”
• “Assessments during Combatant
Command training exercises
confirmed that DOD cyber defenses
are improving, but not enough to stop
adversarial teams from penetrating defenses, operating 
undetected, and degrading missions…”
• “Tests and assessments continue to identify previously
undetected vulnerabilities…”
• “Despite improvements in network defenses, almost every 
assessment and test demonstrated that DOD network 
defenses still contain exploitable problems…”
Framing
Assumptions
• Cybersecurity is a decaying function— static cybersecurity assures a declining
security posture 
• NO SYSTEM is without malware — every system has an inherent vulnerability
that is just waiting to be exploited
• People over rely on the technology for security and don’t sufficiently consider
the people and process components
• The seemingly most secure system often fails to acknowledge that it can be
affected by a higher level threat (e.g. any system can be misconfigured)
• Cybersecurity Policy stands at the Outcome level; Acquisition guidance and implementation below the outcome 
level is subjective (i.e. “Design for the Fight” is an example of an Outcome Level)
• Most programs undershoot “adequate security” —most operate under a false sense of security until they discover 
they did not sufficiently manage realistic and likely operational risks
• DoD may not be proactive enough to exploit its own systems to withstand advanced threats 
- Example.  Netflix: champion of self-imposed chaos. They developed Chaos Monkey in 2011 to test the 
resiliency of their IT infrastructure. The tool works by intentionally disabling computers in Netflix's production 
network to test how remaining systems respond to outages.
Problem 
Statement
Problem Statement: This research study starts with a discussion on policy/directives and then 
explores the efficacy of DoD’s cybersecurity strategy and associated actions taken to date—all 
intended to safeguard the efficacy of DoD systems. 
Goal: Develop a Cybersecurity approach customized for DoD Acquisition organizations that 
characterizes what it takes to implement a robust, effective and sustainable Cybersecurity 
Program 
Logic ModelKirkpatrick Learning Levels Learning & Performance Value Chain
Research Tools
Levels 3 and 4
• The data substantiates the 
training effectiveness
• Measures on-the-job 
performance and accompanying 
behavioral changes due to 
training and reinforcement
• Affords the evidence that 
organizations would expect to 
see from their investment  
Training effectiveness data is key to demonstrating the value that the training has 
contributed to the organization…and that stakeholders find valuable.”
New World Kirkpatrick® Model: Kirkpatrick learning Levels. Adapted from “Four Levels of Training and Evaluation.”
Research Tools
A Logic Model in Action for CyberSecurity*
*Addresses: What is Important? …What is Broken?... What is Critical?... What is no longer useful?...What 
needs to be measured?...What’s the evidence that the investment provided a return?...
Research Tools





















































































*Adapted from  ASTD (2004) as cited in Elkeles, Phillips, & Phillips (2017, p. 10)
Case Study
Workshop Expectations
• Directorate welcomed a way to confirm 
critical cybersecurity behaviors expected of 
them in the prosecution of their all audit 
responsibilities
• Learning had to reinforce execution of tasks 
and realization of behavior
• Develop a learning strategy to monitor pre-
audit engagements that better scopes audit 
objectives
• End-of-workshop survey would evaluate 




Learning objectives cut across the five domains that 
constituted the team’s responsibilities
Workplace Behaviors
• D1: Determine the effectiveness of security 
controls in support of risk management
• D2: Evaluate the performance of security 
controls in support of organizational mission 
assurance objectives
• D3: Justify security control development and 
implementation in support of organization 
mission assurance objectives
• D4: Evaluate security controls at system 
interfaces and that span system of systems 
• D5: Appraise protection of information 
assets in context of a threat level for 





• Figure summarizes what nineteen 
respondents had to say about their 
level II learning levels “before and 
after” after the workshop. 
• Noticeable shifts and distinctions 
from this highly interactive and 
“hands on” event in each learning 
category without exceptions.
• Domain 2 had the most significant 
shift where the respondents no 
longer needed assistance after the 
workshop.  
• Domains 1 and 2 virtually 
eliminated their lack of 











Basic  Understanding 
but cannot perform
















Note:  Using an Anova Test for a comparison of the Means & Standard Deviations of the “Before” & “After” 
values of Attitudes on the Behaviors by Domain.
In all 5 domains, we can reject the Null Hypothesis that “the training had no effect on the Auditor’s attitude 
for the behaviors.”  We accept the Alternate Hypothesis, “the training has a statistically significant effect on 
attitudes towards the behaviors.” 
*ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control Association—110,000 strong in 180 countries)










Initial FindingsQuantitative Baseline—Will Have a Follow-on
I am committed to apply what I learned
I would like to learn more about other cyber 
security practices that I can apply on the job.
I recommend this workshop to my co-workers.
Part 1:
Initial Findings
• We plan to incorporate all the concepts we learned in future audits future
cybersecurity audits
• Being able to plan and execute an audit using Cybersecurity and cyber
resilience concepts and policies/guidance on a system or process.
• To be able to initiate an audit in Cybersecurity with the training, tools, 
and material provided in confidence.
• I will more often consider risks concerned with access to any naval systems that are applicable to assigned 
future audits.
• I plan to work with the audit team to develop potential audit topics that involve Cybersecurity within the 
Department of Navy.
• Be able to identify potential Cybersecurity internal control weakness regarding people and processes.
• Cybersecurity attack vulnerability minimized.
• I will pursue more knowledge in this area to get a better understanding of “how to.”
• Agencies will be better prepared to tackle cyber obstacles they may have not known existed prior to the audit.
• I think the senior Navy leadership will start seeing our capabilities and request more Cybersecurity audits.
Qualitative Comments 








• Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic and ambiguous domain
• Incidental learning is not conducive to cybersecurity
• A lot of good work has been done on core knowledge and core tasks of Cybersecurity 
(e.g. NIST SP 800-181) although it hasn’t been translated into critical behaviors
• The attitude component of Knowledge, Skills, and Attitude (KSA)
is tightly coupled to the achievement of cybersecurity critical
behaviors
• Formal (and tailored) training is only the starting point. What
the workforce applies in the workplace as a result of the
learning is the most important aspect for achieving the outcome—
and it’s up to the organization to monitor, encourage and enforce it! 
Extra, extra
Read all about itThere’s Hope
Win-T failed OT Adversarial Assessment Twice in last couple of 
years—directed by Mr. Kendall (USD (AT&L)) to change approach 
before next OT.
…and they Changed their Approach for Increment 2:
• Program Office went to agile programming, with incremental 
capability drops
• Cybersecurity became part of overall engineering, instead of 
seeking a separate cybersecurity solution
• Independent and frequent testing for all capability drops
• Assumption of breech (assume compromise).  Lowest level of trust 
between their system components and other systems
• Development of threat models, with over 10 million simulations of 
threat models on their system.
• Acclimated both Resource Sponsor and Milestone Decision 
Authority on WIN-T’s approach
“WIN-T Increment 2 is survivable. WIN-T Increment 2 demonstrated 
a robust cyber network defense to protect against an operationally 
realistic cyber threat opposing force.” (DOT&E, 2018, p. 130)
